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For those who have been meditating at a Buddhist monastery over
the last year, the giant squid in the title refers to Goldman Sachs
Inc. Matt Taibbi writing in Rolling Stone magazine1 characterizes
the investment bank as: “a great vampire squid wrapped around
the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into
anything that smells like money.” The article is (to put it mildly)
a colorful polemic hurled at Goldman Sachs accusing it of essentially creating and profiting from various financial bubbles since the
onset of the Great Depression.
Taibbi’s rhetoric was not well received in the mainstream business
press. Reactions were dismissive (along the lines of: simplistic analysis; he’s not a real business reporter!), indignant (basically objecting
to the article’s over-the-top language), defensive (all of them do it,
why pick on Goldman?) but seemed not to engage with the substance
of Taibbi’s accusations. In fact, an ‘audit’ done by the Columbia
Journalism Review’s Dean Sparkman largely validates Taibbi’s substantive claims2.
One of these claims relates to the tech sector bubble of the late
1990s. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that many of the
high-tech IPOs launched in this period were based on dubious
valuations. Goldman was certainly active in IPO underwriting and
had the highest ranking in terms of underwriter reputation [Carter
et al. (1998)]3. The firm also had its share of high-profile misfires
(for example: Webvan, Etoys) when the dot.com mania peaked and
crashed in the spring of 2000. Goldman was also arguably involved
in activities such as spinning and laddering4; the latter has the
effect of artificially pumping up the stock prices of IPO firms in the
aftermarket. But was Goldman a particularly egregious offender in
a climate in which underwriting best practices had slipped precipitously?5 And how should this be evaluated?
As it turns out, we were involved in researching high-tech firms
that had an IPO in the late 1990s. We found significant positive
momentum and sharp reversals within a six-month aftermarket
window6. When we were doing the study, underwriter reputation
was not a central concern — it was only one of several control variables we employed. However, in the wake of the Taibbi article and
the considerable controversy it has generated, we thought it would
be interesting to revisit our sample to see if we could uncover any
interesting facts related to underwriter identity.

The set up
Our primary sample was drawn from ipo.com, which lists the
universe of U.S. IPOs with dates, offer prices etc. classified in a
number of categories. We chose all IPOs from January 1, 1998
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1 � Taibbi, M., 2009, “The great American bubble machine,” Rolling Stone magazine,
issue 1082-83, July 2.
2 � See: Don’t dismiss Taibbi: what the mainstream press can learn from a Goldman takedown, The Audit, posted on the CJR website on August 08, 2009.
3 � Based on the ranking system developed in: Carter, R. B., F. H. Dark, and A. K. Singh,
1998, “Underwriter reputation, initial returns and the long-run performance of IPO
stocks,” Journal of Finance, 53:1, 285-311.
4 Spinning involves the underwriter allocating underpriced IPOs to favored executives
– the quid pro quo being a promise of future business. Laddering involves allocations
conditioned upon buyers agreeing to purchase additional shares of the IPO in the after-

through October 30, 1999 in the following sectors: biotechnology, computer hardware, computer software, electronics, Internet
services, Internet software, and telecommunications. This resulted
in a sample of 301 high-tech IPO firms. We stopped at October 30,
1999 because we wanted to study medium-term aftermarket price
behavior beyond the IPO date while excluding the market correction that commenced in 2000 [Jaggia and Thosar (2004)].
In Figure 1, we provide selected descriptive statistics relating to our
sample broken down by three lead underwriter reputation tiers:
top, medium, and bottom. The top-tier underwriters are those that
received the highest score of 9 in the Carter et al. (1998) ranking system. These are: Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston
(renamed Credit Suisse), Hambrecht & Quist, and Salomon Smith
Barney. The medium-tier underwriters are those with a score
between 8.75 and 8.99, while the bottom tier includes all firms with
a score below 8.75.
There do not appear to be any obvious differences between IPO
firms represented by top-tier underwriters and the others in terms
of objective quality criteria. If anything, metrics such as: the level
of initial underpricing, percentage of profitable firms, and firm age

Underwriter reputation
Variables

Top-tier

Medium-tier

Bottom-tier

Cumulative market-adjusted return
(CMAR) at the end of six months

44.71
(140.91)

19.95
(101.88)

-16.55
(57.23)

Percentage change from offer to
market open price

65.74
(72.26)

68.38
(105.15)

43.66
(73.18)

Percentage of firms with positive net
income in pre-IPO year

21.11
(41.04)

16.90
(37.61)

24.64
(43.41)

83.71
(285.64)

50.71
(200.94)

75.84
(397.87)

134.48
(176.86)

126.97
(490.20)

48.60
(47.48)

Percentage of firms with green-shoe
(over-allotment) option

64.44
(48.14)

54.23
(50.00)

55.07
(50.11)

Percentage of firms belonging to
the Internet services or software
categories

61.11
(49.02)

60.56
(49.04)

59.42
(49.46)

4.45
(3.40)

5.61
(5.88)

5.90
(6.03)

90

142

69

Revenue in pre-IPO year ($ millions)
Offer size ($ millions)

Firm age at IPO date (years)
Number

Notes:
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses below the sample means.
2. Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in the
Carter et al. (1998) system. This category includes Goldman Sachs. Medium-tier
firms are those with a score of 8.75 – 8.99. Bottom-tier are all those below 8.75.
3. A green-shoe provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional
shares at the offer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the provision
indirectly increases underwriter compensation.
Figure 1 – Selected descriptive statistics for IPO firms classified by underwriter
reputation

market. The SEC sanctioned various underwriting firms including Goldman Sachs, which
paid a fine of U.S.$40 million without admitting wrongdoing. The firm also reportedly
paid U.S.$110 million to settle an investigation by New York state regulators.
5 � Taibbi quotes Professor Jay Ritter, a leading IPO researcher at the University of
Florida: “In the early eighties, the major underwriters insisted on three years of
profitability. Then it was one year, then it was a quarter. By the time of the Internet
bubble, they were not even requiring profitability in the foreseeable future.”
6 � See: Jaggia, S., and S. Thosar, 2004, “The medium-term aftermarket in high-tech
IPOs: patterns and implications,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 931-950.
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effect a wealth transfer from the founders and seed financiers of
the firm to outside investors and this is over and above the initial
underpricing of 66 percent for this group (Figure 1). Under normal
circumstances, the underwriters could be justly accused either of
incompetence in terms of valuation or extorting their IPO clients to
enrich themselves and their favored customers.
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Note: Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in
the Carter et al. (1998) system. In our sample, they represent 90 firms. Medium-tier
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On the other hand, if informed investors recognize that tech sector
stock prices are inflated, unsustainable, and are in the market to
exploit the ‘greater fool,’ the CMAR patterns may reflect the ability
of certain underwriters through their analyst coverage, laddering
arrangements, etc., to not only stabilize but pump up prices in the
aftermarket until the wealth transfer from uninformed to informed
investors is duly complete.

Bottom-tier are all those below 8.75 representing 69 firms.

We decided that a closer disaggregated look at the top-tier group
might be useful.

Figure 2 – Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for IPO firms grouped by lead
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with a green-shoe option. A green-shoe provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional shares at the offer price to
cover over-allotments and thereby indirectly increases underwriter
compensation.
A striking and somewhat surprising difference is in the cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) registered by each group.
To study this in greater detail, we graph (Figure 2) the CMAR for
each group using the post-IPO day 1 open price as the base through
trading-day 125 or approximately six months after the IPO date7.
There are visual and arguably economically significant differences
across groups. The bottom-tier group (green) immediately slips into
negative territory and stays there for a six-month CMAR of -16.5
percent. The medium (red) and top (blue) groups display strong
positive momentum and reach a CMAR peak of 40.5 percent (at
day 114) and 61.5 percent (at day 112) respectively. The CMAR then
tapers off possibly due to the onset of lock-up expiration pressures
and at the end of six months ends up at 20.0 percent and 44.7 percent for the medium and top groups respectively.
This can be viewed in a number of ways. If the market is behaving rationally and recognizing ‘true value’ as time elapses, the
45 percent CMAR displayed by the top group represents serious
underestimation of the initial IPO offer prices. It represents in
7 � Let Pi1 represent the day 1 open price of the ith firm and let Pm1 be the corresponding
level of the market (Nasdaq) index. Similarly, Pit and Pmt represent the open price at
day t of the ith firm and the market respectively. The CMAR of the firm at time t is
calculated as: CMARit = [Pit/Pi1] ÷ [Pmt/Pm1] -1. The time in question does not refer to
calendar time, but to the time from the IPO date.

In Figures 3 and 4, we report descriptive statistics and CMAR patterns for the IPOs underwritten by top-tier firms. Hambrecht &
Quist and Salomon Smith Barney are combined so as to represent
a reasonable sample size; Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs are
reported separately.
A few metrics are worth noting. More firms represented by Goldman
(27 percent) were profitable in their pre-IPO year than Credit Suisse

Variables
Cumulative market-adjusted return
(CMAR) at the end of six months �

CS

GS

Rest

80.09
(165.39)

27.51
(131.84)

30.55 �
(121.06) �

74.34
(75.17)

85.67
(81.23)

26.63 �
(28.61) �

Percentage of firms with positive net
income in pre-IPO year �

14.29
(35.64)

27.03
(45.02)

20.00 �
(40.83) �

Revenue in pre-IPO year ($ millions) �

41.34
(147.31)

37.32
(50.56)

199.81
(504.84) �

101.97
(103.99)

155.59
(222.89)

139.63
(165.43) �

Percentage of firms with green-shoe
(over-allotment) option �

67.86
(47.56)

86.47
(34.66)

28.00 �
(45.83) �

Percentage of firms belonging to
the Internet services or software
categories �

71.43
(46.00)

59.46
(49.77)

52.00 �
(50.99)

4.01
(2.13)

5.03
(3.98)

4.07
(3.63) �

28

37

25 �

Percentage change from offer to
market open price �

Offer size ($ millions) �

Firm age at IPO date (years) �
Number �

Notes: �
1. � Standard deviations are in parentheses below the sample means.
2. � Top-tier underwriter firms are those assigned the highest point score of 9 in
the Carter et al. (1998) system; CS = Credit Suisse, GS = Goldman Sachs, Rest =
Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith Barney
3. � A green-shoe provision gives the underwriter the option to purchase additional
shares at the offer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the provision
indirectly increases underwriter compensation. �
Figure 3 – Selected descriptive statistics for IPO firms classified by top-tier
underwriters �
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IPo firm name/current or former
ticker symbol

Rest

100

80

40

199.2 Hambrecht & Quist

B

255.4 Hambrecht & Quist

B

F5 Networks Inc (FFIV)

469.9 Hambrecht & Quist

A

142.7 Goldman Sachs

C

Ebay Inc (EBAY)

623.4 Goldman Sachs

A

Viant Corp (VIAN)

183.6 Goldman Sachs

D

248 Goldman Sachs

C

Allscripts Inc (MDRX)

103.9 Goldman Sachs

A

Tibco Software (TIBX)

182.8 Goldman Sachs

B

119 Goldman Sachs

C

Juniper Network Inc (JNPR)

116.5 Goldman Sachs

A

NetIQ Corp (NTIQ)

141.9 Credit Suisse

C

Appnet Systems Inc (APNT)

158.4 Credit Suisse

C

Commerce One Inc (CMRC)

609.8 Credit Suisse

C

138.3 Credit Suisse

C

Inet Technologies (INTI)
0
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Note: CS = Credit Suisse representing 28 firms; GS = Goldman Sachs representing 37
firms; Rest = Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith Barney together representing
25 firms.
Figure 4 – Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for IPO firms grouped by toptier underwriters

E.Piphany Inc (EPNY)

141.4 Credit Suisse

C

Software.com Inc (SWCM)

Phone.com Inc (PHCM)

237.3 Credit Suisse

C

Tumbleweed Software Corp (TMWD)

201.7 Credit Suisse

C

487.2 Credit Suisse

C

250 Credit Suisse

C

Liberate Technologies (LBRT)
Vitria Technology (VITR)

(14 percent) and the rest (20 percent). Goldman firms were also
marginally longer in business before the IPO date. On the other
hand, Goldman firms were subject to greater initial underpricing on
average. They also had a higher average offer size and were more
likely to be subject to a green-shoe provision8. But the most suggestive statistic in our view is the six-month CMAR. The Goldman
group’s CMAR at 28 percent is significantly lower than that of the
Credit Suisse group which racked up 80 percent. Thus aftermarket
momentum (or manipulation if one were to take the cynical view) is
lowest for firms represented by Goldman.
This is borne out by the CMAR patterns in Figure 4. The red line
representing Goldman firms is virtually flat in the immediate aftermarket, when most purported price pumping takes place. The blue
(Credit Suisse) and green (Hambrecht & Quist and Salomon Smith
Barney) lines suggest higher levels of momentum and reversal
within a six-month period — more of a bubble within a bubble pattern with the benefit of hindsight.
After all is said and done, the tech bubble is only one instance of a
series of such events in recorded history. And, while these events
result in a lot of wealth destruction, the firms left standing in the
end usually signify technological and productivity gains to society,
which may in the long-run exceed the Schumpeterian costs.
We do not profess to know how to execute such a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, we decided to undertake an outlier analysis within our
sample. We carried out a case study-type analysis of the 20 firms
that registered a six-month CMAR of more than 100 percent and
were represented by top-tier lead underwriters. We were essentially
projecting ourselves back in time before the crash and picking a small

Notes:
1. � The above firms were represented by top-tier lead underwriters and experienced
post-IPO six-month cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) greater than 100
percent.
2. Status (August 2009) definitions are given below:
3. � Successful ongoing enterprises; significant positive returns realized by early longterm investors.
4. Viable ongoing enterprises.
5. �Merged, restructured or otherwise consolidated; significant impairment to early
valuations.
6. Defunct.
Figure 5 – Current status of selected IPO firms launched during the dotcom bubble era

subset of the likeliest candidates for success. How did they perform
over the long-term? We traced the fortunes of these 20 firms from
their IPO date up until the present (August 2009). We examined
available financials, stock price performance, mergers, consolidations etc. Several firms were targets of class-action lawsuits filed by
aggrieved stockholders claiming misstatements in the IPO prospectus and the like. Our findings are summarized in Figure 5, which is
essentially a status report on each firm. We assigned each firm into
one of following categories, or letter grades if you will.
A These are all firms that have survived and thrived. In our judgment, they all have successful business models and good prospects going forward. An investor who bought shares soon after
the IPO date and held on to them till August 2009 would have
realized significant positive returns. Only four of the 20 firms
receive an A grade — three of these (Ebay, Juniper Network,
Allscripts) were lead underwritten by Goldman Sachs. The fourth
(F5 Networks) was underwritten by Hambrecht & Quist.
B � The three firms in this category are viewed as viable ongoing
enterprises. There is a fair amount of within-group variation. For
8 � This may reflect Goldman’s greater clout even within the top-tier group.
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Status

Art Technology Group (ARTG)

Active Software Inc (ASWX)

20

lead underwriter

Infospace Inc (INSP)

Inktomi Corp (INKT)
60

CMAR %

instance, Infospace (Hambrecht & Quist) has negative income
in its latest financial year but still has a market capitalization of
U.S.$293 million. Early post-IPO investors who held on to their
position would see a negative return. In contrast, Tibco Software
(Goldman) is profitable, has a current market capitalization of
U.S.$1.61 billion, and a P/E multiple of 27. The only reason Tibco
did not get an A grade is that early buy-and-hold investors would
register a negative stock return.
C � The twelve firms in this group were severely impacted in the
tech sector crash of 2000. While a small number survive with
their original stock ticker symbol, none of these are profitable or
actively traded. Most have merged, restructured, or otherwise
consolidated. The common element is that early investors who
had not divested before the crash would have suffered significant (if not quite total) losses. Goldman represented three firms
in this group.
D The one firm in this category (Viant; Goldman) declared bankruptcy in 2003 and is essentially defunct.
Hambrecht & Quist represented only three firms (1 A; 2 Bs), all of
which survive and in aggregate delivered considerable value to
early investors. Goldman’s record is mixed with three As and a B
balanced out with three Cs and a D. Credit Suisse has the poorest
record in terms of our sample (9 Cs). None of the firms they represented were successful in weathering the tech sector shakeout.
Thus, even among the small subset of IPO firms represented by
top-tier underwriters and greeted with sustained enthusiasm by
investors, ex-post analysis reveals considerable variation in the
staying power of their business models.

Conclusion
A respected market observer recently commented: “When faced
with market euphoria, whatever its source, financial institutions
will always be confronted with the same stark choice: lower your
standards or lower your market share.”9
Goldman was certainly part of the general deterioration of underwriting standards but our analysis reveals that they did represent
some very good firms and in terms of our CMAR analysis were a
reasonably responsible player in the IPO aftermarket. Perhaps their
quality control mechanisms were not quite so compromised. More
recently, they seem to have recognized the risks stemming from
subprime lending well ahead of their competitors, hedged with
some success, and have emerged from the financial crisis more or
less intact10. We doubt that Taibbi would set much store by this but
there it is.

9 � Jonathan A. Knee, senior managing director at Evercore Partners, in the New York
Times, DealBook Dialogue, October 6, 2009.
10 Critics may point out that Goldman would likely have gone under (or at least taken
large losses) if the U.S. taxpayer had not bailed out AIG and thereby its counterparties.
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